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POLICY RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON
May 9, 1957

Part I of Three Parts

Responding to the request of the Secretary of State, Chairman USDEL forwards an appraisal in concrete terms of the inseparable elements of a partial agreement for first steps which we estimate would be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany, other states with a significant nuclear military potential, the USSR, and the UK. It constitutes a program which will advance the priority US objectives as stated by the Secretary of State:

- a) To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional states;
- b) To increase the safeguards against attack upon the US;
- c) To begin to open up the Soviet Union and to open Eastern Europe;
- d) To improve the basis for subsequent and separate negotiation of political settlements and evolution of conditions in Eastern Europe in accord with the US national interest;
- e) To generally lessen the dangers of a nuclear war and facilitate the maintenance of peace.

It will maintain very great US military capability.

The concrete inseparable terms are consistent with the fundamentals of present NSC decisions and present instructions to the USDEL, and do require supplementary instructions on important items.

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State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

Paragraph 1 - The provision for advance notice of intention to suspend should be optional and not a mandatory requirement. Actions by either a signator or a non-signator which prejudice the security of a signator state may be ground for partial or complete suspension of commitments.

Paragraph 2 - The "prohibition" clause to the non-nuclear-weapon signators is not to prohibit their use of nuclear weapons in the event one of the three nuclear-weapons-states associated in a collective security agreement uses nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances the signators, such as the NATO states, are to be free to use nuclear weapons if the United States uses them. Furthermore, the right of preparatory training for such use is to be definitely preserved as to such non-nuclear-weapon signators.

It should also be clear that the forces of one of the three nuclear-weapons-states may possess nuclear weapons on the soil of a non-nuclear-weapons state, unless within a zone in which the stationing of nuclear weapons is specifically and separately prohibited for all.

Paragraph 3 - The exceptions in the manner of use of nuclear weapons by the three nuclear-weapons-states is to be restated so that the exceptions are:

- (a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if an armed attack occurs which includes the use of nuclear weapons, or
- (b) if such an armed attack is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

It should further be made clear that this provision will not imply any obligation to maintain forces of a non-nuclear nature for purposes of repelling non-nuclear attacks. Within the limits otherwise imposed by the partial agreement, it is for each of the "three" signators to decide the most effective distribution of its armament between the nuclear and the non-nuclear.

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✓ 1. The agreement for partial measures would include specific authority for a signator to suspend partially or completely the commitments and obligations taken, upon written notice by it to the control organization of either an important violation by another signator, or a written notice by it of action by a non-signator which prejudices the security of the notifying state and thereby requires the partial or complete suspension of commitments. This provision to include a procedure for advance notice of intention to suspend so that an opportunity for prior correction of the adverse condition may be afforded.

2. All signators (except the US, UK and USSR) to agree that they are prohibited from the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons. *but can use as m³*

✓ 3. The US, UK and USSR (states which have nuclear weapons in their possession on the effective date of the treaty and which continue under the terms of the treaty to possess such nuclear weapons) agree that they are prohibited from use of nuclear weapons except:

a) in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter if an armed attack occurs of such nature and magnitude that, in the decision of the using state, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons; or

b) the attack includes the use of nuclear weapons or
c) in accordance with a decision of either the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council.

✓ 4. The USSR, UK and US to take a further commitment that after the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment

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Paragraph 4 - The commitment to cooperate in the design and installation of a necessary inspection system is also to specifically include a commitment to cooperate in the maintenance of such a necessary inspection system, and these commitments are to be stated prior to and be prerequisite for the "cut-off" date.

Paragraph 5 - The commitment for transfers of fissionable materials should call for transfers over and above certain minimums of material, thereby providing a saving clause for the UK and likewise making it clear that transfers are not contemplated to the extent of elimination or substantial elimination of nuclear weapons capability. The reservation of intention to maintain a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty or the partial agreement is concerned will be a footnote. The right of refabrication of weapons after the "cut-off" date should be definitely maintained.

Paragraph 6 - For the method of aerial inspection, reference will be made to an annex to the treaty, which annex will spell it out in precise details along the lines of the Joint Chiefs and Doolittle detailed work.

Paragraph 6 (a) - For the western half of this initial zone, consider the area of Alaska; and of Canada west of a line from 130 degrees west longitude - 70 degrees north latitude, to Edmonton, and from Edmonton to 95 degrees west longitude on the Canadian-US line; and the continental United States west of 95 degrees west longitude.

Paragraph 6 (b) - The Russian-European zone to be for a European decision in which the US is willing to join. So far as the US is concerned it may be independent of the rest of the agreement, or incorporated in the first step if the Europeans wish it to be so.

of this commitment (estimated as July 1959), the three will devote all future production of fissionable material exclusively to non-weapons purposes, and will transfer to non-weapons purposes any fissionable material not already contained within nuclear weapons; and will commit themselves to cooperate in the design and installation of such a necessary inspection system.

5. Upon the establishment of satisfactorily functioning inspection system and the cut-off on production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes; the USSR, UK and US will commence [agreed equitable proportionate] transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling either national or international; provided, however, that these transfers shall be carried out to only a limited degree and each of the three will be maintaining a very substantial nuclear weapons capability insofar as the terms of the treaty for the partial agreement is concerned.

55-45
n 50-50

6. Upon the effective date of the treaty (estimated as July 1958), the USSR and US and other states concerned will move promptly to install and begin to operate an aerial inspection system in accordance with the approved Eisenhower method in initial zones, including

a) all RPT ALL of the Soviet Union north of the Arctic Circle (including the Murmansk Kola Peninsula and Dikson areas) and all of the Soviet Union east of 108 degrees East longitude (from Lake Baikal to Bering Straits); and an equal geographic area of Alaska, Canada, and Western US.

Initially
+ Alaska and Kamchatka
+ Turkestan
+ Sweden + Finland

great caution relative to offering more US territory in exchange for more Soviet territory.

Paragraph 9 - The "blueprint" is to refer to an inventory of major designated armaments, and of the armed forces, and to be spelled out in detail in an annex worked out by the technical experts. It is, of course, to be exclusive of nuclear weapons.

Paragraph 10 - The internationally supervised national storage is to be only of a percentage of the major designated armaments as reported in the inventory. The military expenditure reduction is to be a supplementary consequence and not a prime factor. The right to check on and endeavor to follow up Soviet military expenditures should be sought, along with a check up of use of major material such as steel and aluminum. Military expenditures is not to be looked upon as a major reliance for inspection purposes.

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b) all of the Soviet Union west of 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude (Minsk-Zhmerinka line) and all of the territory of Europe between 2 and one-half degrees East Longitude and 27 and one-half degrees East Longitude and between 42 degrees, 20 minutes, North Latitude and 63 degrees North Latitude. (Labelled as the Russian and European zone for convenience in this cable).

*Treat separately
and give NATO allies "full voice"*

✓ 7. In addition, upon the effective date of the agreement, the parties will move promptly to establish ground control posts in Soviet bloc and West within the aerial zones, including appropriate radar equipment for added warning safeguards against the potential of great surprise attack.

Treat Separately

✓ 8. In addition, ground control posts will be promptly established in the area of the Soviet Union west of 35 degrees East Longitude and in the UK, and at [the embarkation ports of eastern US.]

9. Three months after the effective date of the agreement (estimated as October 1958), signators would furnish blueprints of military forces and armaments, exclusive of nuclear weapons.

only in inspection zone

10. Within the following nine months after furnishing the blueprints (estimated July 1959), the USSR and the US would (in the manner outlined by the US JCS in the Secretary of Defense letter of October 30, 1956) place in internationally supervised national storage in disarmament depots *(15%)* of the major designated armaments reported in their blueprints, including nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles, and would reduce their armed forces to two and one-half million and would bring the level of their military expenditures down by 15%.

*proportionate
force reduction*

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Paragraph 11 - The Federal Republic of Germany would, of course, not be making agreed reductions, but rather would be accepting a ceiling for its rearmament, in conjunction with the first step partial agreement.

Paragraph 12 - This general inspection commitment should apply to both conventional and nuclear aspects of the agreement.

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(4) 11. Other states signators would make similar (but not precisely the same) agreed reductions under similar reporting and verified inspected conditions.

✓ 12. All signators specifically recognize the essential requirement of an effective inspection system to verify and guarantee in the case of all states alike the fulfillment and observance of each commitment, each signator undertakes to cooperate in the thorough reciprocal installation and implementation of such inspection, and the continued operation of such inspection is an essential requirement for the continuation of the commitments under the agreement.

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Paragraph 14 - This restriction on stationing nuclear weapons in the Russian-European aerial inspection zone, applies only to the nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs. It does not restrict the stationing of dual purpose delivery systems, and does not prohibit the preparatory training of armed forces in the zone for the contingent eventuality of war. The provision does safeguard against the hasty triggering of nuclear weapons in close proximity in the central European area, which could otherwise occur without deliberate decision by the top command in either the US or the USSR. Such a local triggering could institute a nuclear war which the responsible leadership of neither country intended. It also provides additional assurance to fourth countries, such as France, that if they abstain from nuclear weapons production the German armed forces are not likely to have nuclear weapons placed within their control by either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 15 - This is intended to indicate that there will be some reduction in the major designated armaments in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, but that such reduction will be of such a modest amount as to negate any implication of future complete withdrawal.

PART II OF THREE PARTS

Further responding to the request of the Secretary of State, Chairman USDEL forwards Part II of an appraisal in concrete terms of the inseparable elements of a partial agreement for first steps which we estimate would be acceptable to France and the Federal Republic of Germany, other states with a significant nuclear military potential, the USSR, and the UK, and which will advance the priority US objectives as stated by the Secretary of State.

✓ 13. Upon the completion of such initial year reductions each state would file a certificate that it had carried out the reduction, and mobile inspection teams would then have access to the objects of control in all areas of the signator states to verify the fulfillment of the reductions.

✓ 14. Upon the initiation of the aerial inspection and the installation of the ground inspector posts in the areas indicated in Part I, (estimated September 1958) (and the commitment of the USSR to the other inseparable provisions of this report) all states involved would be prohibited from maintaining or from stationing nuclear weapons in that part of the Soviet Union and that part of Europe included within the Russian-European aerial inspection zone.

✓ 15. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US by 15% for armaments and to the force level of 2.5 million,

Paragraph 16 - The commitment to progressively expand the aerial inspection system and to progressively expand the ground inspection system would not include the precise steps or timing for such expansion.

Paragraph 17 - This provision would indicate on the one hand some reduction in bases, but on the other hand would affirm that the reduction would be of such small magnitude as to reflect the fact that complete elimination of foreign bases is not contemplated in any disarmament agreement which the US would accept.

Paragraph 18 - It would be made clear that the temporary suspension for twelve months of all nuclear tests contemplates the possibility of resuming limited testing by the three after such temporary suspension, but that such limited testing would be with unilateral restraint, with due regard to health, and with advance notice of intention to test. Or such resumed testing would be specifically limited under inspection to an agreed safe amount of fissionable material.

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(estimated as July 1958 to July 1959) both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone by 20%.

16. At the end of the first year's reduction in armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures (estimated as July 1959) progressively expand the aerial inspection system beyond the original two zones, into a series of additional zones culminating in the complete coverage of the Soviet Union and (if the political situation permits) China, and, reciprocally of the Free World areas including the US and the UK. The ground control posts to also be progressively expanded and increased to complete effective coverage.

✓ 17. During the year of fulfillment of the reduction of worldwide levels of armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US by 15% for designated armaments and to the level of two and one-half million for forces, including the parallel 20% reduction of the armaments and armed forces which the Soviet Union and the US had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, make an agreed reduction in air bases on both sides within the Russian-European aerial inspection zone of a magnitude of approximately 10%. *Sep. 1st draft*

18. Upon the effective date of the partial agreement treaty (estimated as July 1958) all signators would be committed to a temporary suspension for 12 months of all nuclear tests and during such 12 months to cooperate in the design of an agreed inspection system which would support the nuclear materials cut-off commitment, and which would also verify either an agreement for limitation on the amount of fissionable

*Set up
what I'd inspect
refuge for
now? but
rescue
therefore
in absence of
Spec agreement
but to give
now freedom in
advance,
limited access to both
and limitation on
atmospheric release*

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Paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22 - The effect of these four provisions is to indicate a willingness to move further in the event of full compliance with the first step, and in the event of satisfactory political solutions, but at the same time to make clear that a reduction to a point of extreme weakness or of internal security forces definitely is not contemplated in US policy, even under the most favorable circumstances.

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material released per year into the atmosphere by the three in future tests, or to verify a continued limited suspension of tests. The agreement to be so drawn that a failure to agree upon and to install the inspection system involved for these two commitments or the failure to agree on either a limitation of tests or further suspension of tests beyond the 12 months would automatically result in no (REPEAT NO) legal commitments against tests after the 12 months.

19. If the first year's reductions in armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are verified to the satisfaction of the permanent members (including the US) of the armament regulation Board of Control, then, and only then, (estimated as July 1959 or later), a second reduction of armaments and armed forces and military expenditures of the USSR and the US to be arranged, but only with the US consent, and not, in any event, going below a force level of 2 million, and to be further conditioned upon the assurance of application of the treaty and the inspection system to all essential, significant military states and areas, and therefore requiring prior solution of the political problems in a manner satisfactory to the US insofar as they apply to this subject.

OK to discuss without commitment

20. During the period of fulfillment of the reduction of levels of designated armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US on the basis of measurement to a level of 2 million (estimated as July 1959 to July 1961), both would also reduce the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone by an additional 20%.

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21. Upon the fulfillment of such second reductions and the verified certification that they have been carried out, including the second reductions of specified other militarily significant states who must as a prerequisite have complied, and the partial political settlements necessary thereto having been reached, the armaments regulation organization to consider, but only with the consent of the US, further reductions, and not, in any event, to consider further reductions to any levels lower than 1.5 million for the Soviet Union and 1.5 million for the US unless and until a supplementary treaty is negotiated and ratified by the usual constitutional processes.

22. In the event further reductions of levels of armaments and armed forces are carried out beyond the 2 million level, during the fulfillment of such reductions, both the USSR and the US would further make parallel inclusive reductions of the armaments and armed forces which they had located in the Russian and European aerial inspection zone, but not in any event under the terms of the treaty, by more than 20%. (Even in these ultimate circumstances at least 40% of US forces would remain in the Western side of the Russian and European zone including Germany, insofar as the terms of the agreement would be concerned).

23. The signators agree that within 3 months after the effective date of the treaty (estimated to be October 1958) they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to design inspection controls (and upon reaching an agreed definition, to install them) to fulfill a commitment that sending objects through

which would make possible to secure

*express hope
only.*

Paragraph 25 - The system of advance notification is to be developed along the lines of the Doolittle and Colclough report, to cover submarines as well as bombers, and to add to the safeguards against great surprise attack.

H. E. Stassen

~~outer space and sending unmanned objects over distances in excess of medium range at any altitude, shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, and further designed to verify and insure compliance with a commitment not to build or to install intercontinental ballistic or guided missiles or rockets.~~

✓ 24. The armaments regulation organization administering the system to be established in accordance with Article 26 of the UN Charter within the framework of the Security Council, and to operate through an executive council or board of control on which the affirmative vote of the US and of the Soviet Union is essential for significant decisions.

✓ 25. Such board of control to have authority to establish a system for the advance notification by signatories of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space as a part of the system of protection against great surprise attack.

✓ 26. The essential details for the evolutionary development of an effective and sound inspection system are to be worked out in keeping with the foregoing outline and consistent with the studies of the eight US Presidential Task Groups chairmanned by Gen. Bedell Smith, Gen. James Doolittle, and Dr. Ernest Lawrence and others.

✓ 27. Authorize the armaments regulation organization through its board of control to establish an appropriate system regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect after the exchange of military blueprints.

~~EXCERPT~~
Whole paper an inseparable part of whole
unless contrary state

Part III of Three Parts

Further responding to the request of the Secretary of State, USDEL forwards recommendations for the method of negotiation as Part III of this report.

A. The negotiating method of reaching a partial agreement to serve the U.S. priority objectives, as outlined in Parts I and II, would in each instance involve the USDEL advancing initial restricted proposals providing for some bargaining latitude between the present U.S. position and the outlined basis for the negotiated agreement.

B. A parallel negotiating process, centered in the Sub-Committee, conducted with the other Western members as well as with the Soviet Union will continue to be essential, since on each of the major issues each State has tended to take a one-sided first RPT first position from a narrow national viewpoint.

C. As tentative agreements are reached on the substance of particular sections the major drafting work to reflect the conclusion into treaty language will be carried out by Ambassador Peaslee working with the Legal Department of the UK Foreign Office and with specific draft language forwarded by each Delegation to the capitals of the Sub-Committee States for approval before incorporation in the draft treaty.

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D. When the work reaches an advanced point a formal Sub-Committee report of progress to the UN Disarmament Commission should be made to supplement the informal liaison which the USDEL officers are maintaining with the member states who are not on the Sub-Committee.

E. As this process continues, it will be a special matter for the Secretary of State to conclude as to the point at which the U.S. Senate is to be consulted more thoroughly.

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Same % age of US as of Sov Union

Same acreage of NATO as of Sov Bloc

Total 14 million m² 12 m m²

41% of Sov Union

3 steps of zones last one of which will cover whole US - USSR.

Start with Arctic Circle

+ Alaska and equal bunch of Siberia + E Kamchatka

Radford: Aerial inspection ~~exp~~ mobile ground isn't worth much

Stassen saw by coming down into Leningrad area

See Stase very worried about public reaction in unpeopled area

VP concerns in part but says good deal for us can be sold.